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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study was to determine, if possible, the
effects of party affiliation on the decisions of the Interstate
Commerce Commission. The effects were determined by comparing the
voting patterns of the individual commissioners in five categories of
decisionmaking with standard positions constructed from the Democratic
Platform Plank of 1956 on Transportation. Conformity with the
standards were considered to be the Democratic position, while
nonconformance with the standards were construed to be the Republican
position. Partial concurrences and dissents were given a halfway
value between the two positions.
From the data as processed it was found that there was no
significant, correlation between party affiliation and any decision of
the individual Commissioners. As a matter of fact, there seemed to be
a.high percentage of the decisions which were contrary to the assumed
party positions. Further study revealed that this contrariety tended
to be associated with Commissioners who had previously held public
office and who had had legal training.

THE INFLUENCE OF PARTY AFFILIATION ON
DECISIONS OF THE INTERSTATE
COMMERCE COMMISSION

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Interstate Commerce Act, recognizing the position of the
Commission as an agency enforcing and interpreting public policy,
provides that not more than six of the eleven commissioners shall be
appointed from the same political party.^

History records the fact

that the fixed, overlapping terms of the commissioners, the bipartisan
composition, and the vague guarantees of tenure were incorporated in
the original legislation to insure that the Commission would be
independent of the executive.

While the requirement for ‘'balance” of

members with different party affiliations was aimed at preventing
“packing,” experience has shown that these safeguards do not protect
against public Instruction by the President, congressional ire, or
budgetary controls imposed by either or both.
It was not until the Lake Cargo Coal Rate Controversy of the
1930s that recognition was given to the fact that there were political
pressures both from within the government and from outside that could
present a challenge to the "independence” of the Commission.

The

^-Statutes at Large, XLIX, at ,481.
^Harvey C. Mansfield, The Lake Cargo Coal Rate Controversy
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1932), pp. 141-43.
2

3
political pressures, as observed, took one of two forms.

First there

were those who sought to influence the adjustment of controversies on
the horizon, or in the actual process of determination.

Second,

there were those who sought to mold the general course and direction
of regulatory policy through manipulation of the appointing power.
Those who thought to apply such pressures were assuming, either
explicitly or implicitly, that the Commission was a part of the
administration and was, therefore, a legitimate medium for the
expression of partisan political policy.
Since 1920 there have been several incidents involving the
executive branch which were calculated to embarrass the Commission in
its free exercise of control.

President Harding urged his views

privately on at least one of the commissioners concerned with the
postwar rate adjustments, while President Hoover, on at least two
occasions, publicly expressed his support and approval of positions
which he thought proper in cases then in hearing before the
Commission.^
There were also incidents of undue emphasis on political
considerations in the choice of appointees during the Coolidge years.
The tactics involved in political wirepulling of this type, when
sectionalism becomes involved, tends to generate partisanship and

^I. L. Sharfman, The Interstate Commerce Commission:
in Administrative Law and Procedure, Vol. II (New York: The
Commonwealth Fund, 1931), p. 453.
^'Ibid. , pp. 455-56.

A Study
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extend the influence of the appointing and confirming authorities.
Even the long tradition of the renomination of effective commissioners
was violated in the Senate of the 70th Congress, 1st Session because
of a single decision on the part of Commissioner Esch, and not on the
grounds of malfeasance or nonfeasance.^
Some legislative enactments have also been calculated to
*

affect the scope of jurisdiction and the range of functions and
activities of the Commission.

Examples were the Hoch-Smith Resolution

on special rates for agricultural products, and the various bills
seeking to abolish the Pullman surcharge authorized by the Commission
in 1925.6
In a 1935 opinion the Supreme Court expressed the feeling that
the members of the Interstate Commerce Commission were called upon to
exercise the trained judgment of a body of experts ". .' . appointed
by law and informed by experience."

The Court went on to imply that,

despite the fact that the Commissioners were appointed by the head
of the party in power, and administered laws passed as the result of
political decisions, they must act with complete impartiality in the
public interest.^

Since the Commissioners are members of an adminis

trative tribunal sharing the executive function of administering and

^Ibid., pp. 461-62.
^Sharfman cites Statutes at Large, XLIII, at 801 and 95
ICC 469 as examples at p. 465.
^Humphrey's Executor v. U.S., 295 U.S. 602.

5
implementing stated legislative purposes, they must adopt the posture
of executives acting within a policy framework and not that of judges
deciding impartially between adversaries.

While both an executive

and a judge use the same essential materials of decision, the
executive's use of the evidence is far more subjective than the
judge's.

The executive must exercise a greater degree of discretion

and apply more value judgment

in the application of statute law to

concrete situations and in enunciating policy according to his
expert knowledge and the best of his belief.^
The real cause of this diffusion and sharing of executive
responsibility in the Federal Government is to be found in such
basic political factors as ccngres-sional-presidential rivalries, the
decentralization of political parties, the absence of responsible
party government., and the prevalence of particularistic interests in
this country.

The so-jcal.led "independence" of the regulatory

commissions is, therefore, only a symptom of the phenomenon and not
the proximate cause of the diffusion according to Bernstein. 9
If this is so,, then what difference does the makeup of the
Interstate Commerce Commission make?

Do the individual commissioners

let their political philosophy, as evidenced by their party

^Herbert Simon, Administrative Behavior; A Study of Decision
Making Processes in Administrative 0rganiza11.ons (New York:
Macmillan Co., Inc., 1954)
^Marver H. Bernstein, Regulating Business by Independent
Commission, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1955),
pp. 168-69.
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affiliation, influence their vote on cases heard before them?
Political scientists of the past twenty years have found no concrete
evidence that any political pressures have influenced the Commission
as a whole, but most of their data boil down to expressions of opin
ion rather than fact.

Of course these tendencies, symptoms and causes

are not always evidenced in the public record and are not easily
appraised today by reference to precise and dogmatic standards.^
Since no group of human beings can be.completely objective
under such pressures, it is the purpose of this writer to find out
how much subjectivity is evident in the decisions of the Interstate
Commerce Commission by comparing the voting patterns of the commis
sioners on several issues of general transportation importance with
the stated public policies of the two major political parties on the
regulation of business in general, and the transportation industry in
particular, as reflected in the party platform.

The second purpose of

this study is to disclose, if possible, what attitudes and beliefs of
the commissioners may be adduced from their voting patterns.

In a

word, how consistent are they in their decisions?

The Approach of the Study
Schubert cites three theoretical approaches available for
f
-

such research into judicial decisionmaking; the traditional, the
conventional, and the behavioral.

Although these three are not

mutually exclusive, the writer chose to subordinate the traditional

lOsharfman,

o p . c i t ., pp. 452-77.
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and conventional approaches in favor of the behavioral approach for
several reasons.

First, the traditional theory seeks consistencies

among output norms; second, the conventional looks for any observable
consistencies in patterns of interaction between the commissioners and
the other actors in the procedural process.

Only the behavioral

approach focuses upon the consistencies in the patterning of individual
sets of values, consistencies between individual sets of values, and
consistencies among an individual's inputs, his values, and his out
puts.

In short, the traditional theory deals with output relation

ships: the conventional with both input and output relationships; and
the behavioral with the input, conversion, and output relationships.
The demands of the litigants which the Commission perceives
not only as "objective content," but also as functions of the status
of the litigants and the competence of the practitioners who present
the cases, will be considered as the inputs to the process.

Whatever

the direction of the response by the Commission, it is likely to be
more intense when the arguments for an issue are reinforced by the
advocacy of a recognized practitioner who is experienced in
interacting with the Commission and its staff.

A second general

source of inputs derives from the lower echelons of the Commission
which initially reacted to the demands.

Disagreement over conclu

sions as to the application of law to fact leads to the appeal
procedure which involves the Commission en banc.

A third source of

inputs is the record of the case, the briefs, petitions and the oral
arguments presented to the Commission.

There are the facts in the

8
case and those of the case.

The former consist of a description of

the events that led up to the conflict of interests between the
litigants and the position of the interveners.

The events that

transpired in the preliminary administrative adjudication, including
the actions of the hearing examiners, boards, and divisions of
the Commission are the facts of the case.

Then there are the

inputs by the critics of the Commission, i.e., Congressmen and
Senators acting as individuals, executive suasion, judicial
prerogative, statements by professional societies, testimony by
^industry associations, et cetera.
^

By conversion is meant that subprocess by which issues are

‘recognized and decided as the result of group interaction, the.
^integration of value-judgments of the individual commissioners, the
^'shared perceptions of policy, and the factual questions raised by the
|tlitigants.

Both issues and values are dynamic inputs which through

the conversion process become the outputs of the policymaking system.
The values may change slowly with time for the acquisition of values
are a part of the socialization process, but the demands and issues
may fluctuate widely.
Schubert also shows that there are three major attitudinal
components of ideological liberalism and conservatism, namely those
affecting the political, economic and social outlooks of the judges
involved.

Since the Interstate Commerce Commission is structured

with a judicial framework as an administrative tribunal, it would
be reasonable to assume that the same ideological components affect

9
the outlook of the commissioners.

A political liberal on the

Commission would tend to place emphasis on the rights of employees of
carriers and the public which they serve.

A political conservative, on

the other hand, would favor the status quo with regard to regulatory
matters.

An economic liberal would believe in and support a more'

equal distribution of the profits, and better services at less cost.
An economic conservative would defend private enterprise, protect
vested interests, and uphold the broad differential in wealth and
income between management and labor.

A social liberal would be pre

disposed toward individual personal rights of employees and clientele,
but toward collective property rights.

A social conservative would

lean toward collective personal rights, but insist on. individual
property rights.
Schubert's study found a high degree of rationality in judi
cial decisionmaking consisting primarily of a psychological
structuring of attitudes in the minds of individual judges, rather
than of a logical structuring of rationalizations for outcomes as
expressed in written opinions.

There is every reason to believe that

a similar level of rationality may be found in the decisionmaking
within the Interstate Commerce Commission because of the judicial
aura with which the agency has been endowed from its inception.
It is further suggested that the rationality may be attributed to
the attitudes of the decisionmakers toward policy issues, and not
in other cause-and-effect relationships between decisions and

10
output norms.^^
The attitudes of decisionmakers toward policy issues often
parallel their political affiliations, but the predilections to which
members of judicial bodies and administrative tribunals respond will
not necessarily be evinced in either their written opinions or in the
records of the cases heard.

There are many other influences acquired

during early education, and work experience, such as political
influences in the broad sense, educational backgrounds, and partisan
political policies which an administration will seek to implement.
Since all of the.se will affect the output of the Commission to seme
degree, they must be explored before a viable conclusion can be
arrived at.
One factor which may be quantitatively measured and which
rrefkects the attitude of individuals is the voting pattern on a
.^sufficient number of cases involving specific issues so as to be
statistically significant.

By mathematical techniques these quanti

tative measurements can serve as indicators, but the attributes and
influences which lead up to these voting patterns must be identified
before any interpretation may be attempted.

l^GIendon Schubert, The Political Role of the Courts:
Judicial Policy-Making (Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresman and
Company, 1965), pp. 120-25.

CHAPTER II

POLITICAL INFLUENCES

Historically sponsors and reformers of American regulatory
commissions have had a rather naive view of the political processes in
a democracy.

For instance, the advocates of the Interstate Commerce

Commission insisted on keeping it out of the hurly-burly of politics,
and in the hands of capable and expert men who would protect the
public interest unencumbered by political influences.

This bias of

Progressive political thought which was prevalent in the first decade
of this century was combined with the legalistic emphasis on adjudica
tion by the legal profession which resulted in the sad misconstrual of
the regulatory process by proponents of the "independent” commission.
They were unable to understand the true nature of the. problem which
the Commission would face.
As Bernstein explained:
The process of regulation is unavoidable political. So long
as regulation is conditioned by the general political and social
environment, and remains founded on the efforts of organized
groups to utilize public power to promote either private ends or
the public welfare, it will remain a major aspect of political
life. It is political not in the image of progressive reformers,
that is corrupt, fraudulent, dishonest, and motivated by desire
for private gain. Politics refers rather to the emergence of
public issues, formulation of public policies, and administration

11
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of governmental affairs. 12
It would, therefore, be no surprise to find that there is
political influence exerted on the Commissioners of the Interstate
Commerce Commission.

The question is from what sources and to what

degree the influences will be apparent.

Presidential Influence
By the very act of making appointments a President becomes
engaged in a political act, and his appointments are going to reflect
his own political policies to a greater or lesser degree.
Herring relates that Wilson's appointments were often
criticized on the grounds of policy, while Harding accommodated
friends and associates.

With Coolidge questions of qualifications

were clearly subordinated to political considerations.

Bernstein

also agrees with Herring that it is shortsighted to look upon
politics as a malevolent force since the problem is much more funda
mental.

Politics in the broad sense simply cannot be separated from

national policy, but what is reprehensible is the political inter
ference which is petty, personal, and partisan.

For instance, the

manner in which Harding and Coolidge controlled their appointees by

^2-Marver h . Bernstein, Regulating Business by Independent
Commission (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1955),
pp“. 71-73,” 258.
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the subterfuge of retaining an undated letter of resignation was
clearly unethical. 13
According to Cushman, all presidents from Wilson to
Franklin D. Roosevelt have attempted to influence the activities and
policies of the Commissions in one Xvay or another.^

Even the

Progressive Reformer, "Teddy" Roosevelt, did not hesitate to call two
Interstate Commerce Commissioners to the White House to discuss a
pending case with the President of the New York, New Haven, and
Hartford Railroad Company, while President Hoover used the technique
of issuing a public statement on the outcome of a case on the
Commission's docket to influence a favorable decision.
Franklin D.. Roosevelt attempted to oust a Commissioner from the
Federal Trade Commission who displeased him, but he did not succeed.
The Commissioner, Humphrey, died before the litigation was concluded,
but the executor of his estate carried the case to the Supreme Court
where it was decided that a commissioner could only be removed for
inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office, but not'for
reasons such as political expediency or convenience.

1fi

13E. Pendl eton Herring, Federal Commissioners: A Study of
Their Careers and Qualifications (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard
University Press, 1936), pp. 77-79.
^Robert E. Cushman, The Independent Regulatory Commissions
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1941), pp. 681-85.
•^Bernstein, op. cit., pp. 110-11.
■
^Humphrey's Executor v. U.S., 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
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Political Party Influence
The question of why there should be political interference with
the inner workings of the Interstate Commerce Commission could be
answered rhetorically, ’’Why not?”.

Superficially both questions are

too obvious, but as one goes deeper, one becomes too involved with
human nature to obtain a simple answer.
The political influence takes many forms, some of which are
inevitable.

One type results from the fact that many prominent party

functionaries outside of the government are also lawyers and practice
before the Commission.

Then there are the officeholders and aspirants

at the state level who contribute much heat, but not much light,
through fiery oratory and campaign pledges about sectional disputes
being heard before the Commission.

Lastly, there are those seekers of

patronage positions within the regulatory organization staffs. 1 7'
When Executive Order Number 10440 of March 31, 1953, amended
the Civil Service Commission's Rule VI, three new classes of excepted
positions were added to the list of patronage jobs.

The Commission

was also authorized to reclassify or add positions to the confidential
or policymaking category upon recommendation of the agency concerned.
The

Eisenhower Administration by this move removed the patronage

system from the centralized control of the Executive Offices at the
White House and transferred the function to the Washington office of

^.Harvey C. Mansfield, The Lake Cargo Coal Rate Controversy
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1932), pp. 155-56.
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the Republican National Committee, which then became the clearinghouse
for filling federal jobs not covered by the Civil Service System. 18
As the system worked in 1954, Republican Senators, Congressmen, and
state patronage managers recommended applicants to the National
Committee which forwarded the recommendations to the appropriate
agencies.

Each department and agency was supposed to notify the

National Committee monthly of their vacancies in noncovered positions,
and weekly of their appointments. 19
When the Democrats reassumed control in 1961,
.Lawrence F. O ’Brieui was named Special Assistant for Personnel and
-Congressional Relations which in effect made him the patronage boss of
the new regime.

The combination of personnel and congressional rela

tions responsibilities and the assignment of O'Brien to the Executive
■Staff in the White House underlined the intent of the Democrats to use
patronage as lever to promote Kennedy's programs.

20

This intent was

reinforced during the Johnson years when yet another group of
positions were placed in the exempt category, the noncareer executive

18U.S., President, Executive Order No. 10440, "Amendment of
Civil Service Rule VI," Federal Register, XVIII, 63 (March 31, 1953),
1823.
^ N e w York Times, October 28, 1954.
^ N e w York Times, January 3, 1961.

16
assignments.21
The effect of both of these Presidential actions on the
Interstate Commerce Commission is shown in Table I.

TABLE 1
PATRONAGE POSITIONS AT THE ICC

Year
1953

Exempted Position Title
Confidential Assistant to each
Commissioner

Number

11

1954

Managing Director3

1

1965

Congressional Liaison Officer3

1

1968

Confidential Assistant to the
Managing Director

1

1969

Congressional Liaison Assistant

1

1970

Secretary to the Congressional
Liaison Officer
Total:

_1
16

a'Indicates Noncareer Executive Assignments

Congressional Influence
Beyond the power to create an independent regulatory agency
•such as the Interstate Commerce Commission, Congress can and does
exercise a continuing oversight with respect to all of the regulatory
•

agencies.

First, there is the technique of supplemental enactments,

2-^U.S., President, Executive Order No. 1.1315, "Amending the
Civil Service Rules to Authorize an Executive Assignment System for
Positions in Grades 16, 17, 18 of the General Schedule," Federal
Register, XXXI, 225 (November 19, 1966), 14729.
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such as the Hoch-Smith Resolution of 1925, and the National
Transportation Policy of 1940, which direct the Interstate Commerce
Commission to pursue certain specific policies under certain circum
stances.

Second, there is the budget and appropriations process

which affords an opportunity for Congress to tangibly express
approval or disapproval of the work of the Commission.

Third, there

is the direct technique of legislating members of a Commission out of
office, as occurred to members of the Federal Tariff Commission in
1930. 2 "
?

■

-

A fourth technique is reserved to the Senate by virtue of

their position in confirming all initial appointments and reappoint
ments.

In

1928

Commissioner Each of the Interstate Commerce

Commission fell victim to this type of action because influential
members of the Senate felt that his inconsistent voting in the Lake
Cargo Coal Controversy was the result of political interference,
although no proof was ever found. 23
Besides the positive influences that Congress can wield,
there is also a negative influence of limiting the discretionary
powers of the President in removing members of a commission from
office.

If he can remove them, the President can control the

commissioners.

If he cannot, then the confirmation by the Senate is

the last word.

How far the power of Congress extends in restricting

the removal power of the President has been outlined in two landmark

22statutes at Large, XLVI, at 590, 696 (1931).
2%lansfield, op. cit., pp. 178-83.

18
cases decided by the Supreme Court.

0/

The results are somewhat

ambiguous and disappointing in that the scope of the removal power
depends on the character of the office in question.

The question of

whether Congress can make a commission completely independent by
denying the President authority to remove members for cause remains
unanswered.
From the viewpoint of the Commission, good rapport with the
legislators is imperative for survival, and the commissioners and
career administrators strive to socialize committee members,
especially the chairmen, to their agency's point of view.

It is also

essential that the agency reciprocate by providing technical help and
information.to Congressmen and Senators on a quid pro quo basis.1
The resulting influence which the legislators exert individually
(party aside) is different from that which members of the committees
of interest in the Congress exert in their official capacities.

In

the latter case the members are concerned with public policy and
decisionmaking which the Commission must administer, while in the
former the legislators are involved with particularistic interests of
their geographic, or technical interest constituencies.

The effect on

^Meyers y. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926); and Humphrey's
Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
25cushman, op. c.it., pp. 448-61.
“^Francis E. O ’Rourke, Bureaucracy, Politics, and Public
Policy (Boston, Massachusetts: Little, Brown and Company, 1969),
pp. 24-31.
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the decisions of the Commission is likely to be greater where the
public interest is concerned than where personal concerns are
involved.

The relative power of the lawmakers in either case is a

matter of seniority, the relationship between the individual and the
Commission, or the subject matter under consideration.

It cannot be

attributed to some intrinsic characteristic of their personality.^
The reach for influence by individual members of Congress has
even included the time-honored prerogative of handling patronage with
special reference to the top appointive, posts and those sensitive
policymaking positions not subject to civil service tenure restric
tions, Schedule C jobs.^
Frequently one hears of an independent regulatory body
referred to as "an arm of Congress," but this does not describe a
legal relationship and cannot be used as an argument, for the
existence of such a body.

While it is true that such delegated

powers as ratemaking are legislative in nature, they are of the
"sublegislative" variety and are subject to review.

Furthermore,

there never has been a delegation of tasks to any independent agency

27Andrew Hacker, "The Utility of Quantitative Methods in
Political Science," Contemporary Political Science, ed. by
James C. Charlesworth (New York: Free Press, 1967), pp. 136-37.
^ F o r some recent examples of Commissioners who owe their
appointments to such fortuitous circumstances see Appendix B,
biographical material on: William I. Lee, Walter M. W. Sp'lawn,
Charles A. Webb, Robert W. Minor, Paul J. Tierney, and
George M. Stafford. All, at one time or another, were on the staffs
of Congressmen, Senators, or Committees of one or another of the
Houses of Congress.
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that could not just as well have been performed by an executive officer.
Thus in true perspective the independent regulatory agencies are
separate institutions of government sharing some of the powers of all
three branches.

Educational Backgrounds
In 1936, Herring conducted a study of the careers of the
Federal Commissioners of the past, and looked into many of the factors
and qualifications which were part of their educational backgrounds.
The data which he compiled led him to make the following generali
zation:
The extremes [ of educational experience ] stress the great
unevenness in the formal training of the men who have come to our
commissions. . . . One hundred twenty-six commissioners attended
public high schools. Only eleven men were educated at private
academies, and the select private preparatory schools are
conspicuously absent.29
Herring's data on the forty-three Interstate Commerce
Commissioners appointed up to that time shows that 49 per cent had
undergraduate degrees, 14 per cent had graduate degrees, and that
7 per cent attained doctorates.

Of twenty-seven with legal

experience, 21 per cent had studied law privately, 9 per cent had
some law school experience, while 30 per cent had received their
LL.B. degrees.
Of the nineteen commissioners whose backgrounds were

^^Herring, op. cit., pp. 33-34.
^^Ibid., Append ix C, p. 109.
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researched for this study 10 per cent stopped their education at the
high school level, 85 per cent attained undergraduate degrees, and
5 per cent received a graduate degree.

Seventeen of the commissioners

had legal backgrounds (89 per cent), fourteen had LL.B.Vs (74 per
cent), one had a graduate degree (5 per cent), while two held
doctorates (10 per cent).

Other background information is included

in Appendix B data.
Part of the educational background of the commissioners
included in this study was the development of their concept of'
politics and what party affiliations they made.

In this regard, it

was assumed that they would have followed in general the image that
the'-public had at that period in time.

Party Platforms and Policies
The public image of the Republican and Democratic policies on
regulatory matters during the period when most of the commissioners
included in this study were just beginning their careers has been
clarified by some of the data collected by the Gallup Poll on
presidential voting preferences.

For instance, in a sample of

presidential preferences in the 1936-1940 time frame with relation to
the distribution of responses to the question, "During the next four
years do you think there should be more or less regulation of business
by the Federal Government than at present? . .

59 per cent of

2,386 Democratic stalwarts wanted as much, if not more, regulation,
while 76 per cent of the Republican standpatters desired less.

22
Of voters shifting from a Republican preference, in 1936 to a
Democratic preference in 1940, 51 per cent of the eighty-five respond
ents favored more regulation, while of those 660 individuals whose
preferences shifted from the Democrats to the Republicans 63 per cent
desired less regulation.

Among the 403 new Democratic voters, 57 per

cent wanted as much, if not more, regulation, while 55 per cent of the
285 new Republican voters desired less Federal regulation of
31
business.“
-The traditional image of the Republican Party since the decade
after the Civil War has been one of laissez faire economic policies
when it came to regulation of business and industry.

Even when the

Progressive wing of the party under Theodore Roosevelt was in control,
they were more interested in reforming the mechanics of government by
such, devices as the direct election of senators, the direct primary,
and the initiative and referendum than they were in the regulation of
business.

This tendency has carried right down to the period under

,32
study.
The Republican platform of 1960 in commenting on transportation
called for:
Continued improvement of our vital transportation network
carrying forward rapidly the vast Eisenhower-Nixon national
highway program and promoting safe, efficient, competitive and

31v. 0. Key, with the assistance of Milton C. Cummings, Jr.,
The Responsible Electorate (New York: Vintage Books, 1968),
pp. 44-56.
^^Bernstein, op. cit., pp. 34-39.
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integrated transport by air, road, rail and water under equita
ble, impartial and minimal regulation directed to those ends
[ emphasis added ] .33'
The Curtis Report on which the 1960 platform was based was a
digest of the opinions of twenty-four experts.

It placed stress on

private enterprise,, private incentive, minimal activity by the
Federal Government, increased tax concessions to business, et cetera.
Then Vice-President Nixon expressed the view that as little government
O /

as possible was the most important principle of the Republican Party.
- The 1964 Republican Platform, while it made no specific
reference to transportation, did commit the party to simplify regula
tory requirements, to M. . . put an end to powergrabbing regulatory
actions-. . . ," to eliminate excessive bureaucracy, and
In all such matters relating to Federal Administration it
". will be the Republican way to provide maximum service for each
- tax dollar expended, watchfully superintend the size and scope
•of Federal activities and assure an administration always fair,
efficient and cooperatively disposed toward every element of our
competitive system. . . .35
Democrats have, ever since they espoused the Populist view
point in the campaign of 1896, been advocates of regulation of
business in the public interest.

They have sponsored much of the

basic transportation regulation and supplementary legislation such

33j£xrk H. Porter and Donald Bruce Johnson, National Party
Platforms, 1.840-1964 (Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press,
1966), pp. 609-10.
E. Harris, The Economics of the Political Parties
Macmillan Co., Inc., 1962), pp. xx-xxv.

34.Seymour

(New York:

35porter and Johnson, op. cit.., pp. 684-85.
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as the National Transportation Policy, the Motor Carrier Act of 1935,
and Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act.

Perhaps

the Democrats toward transportation regulation

thebest statement of
is found in the

Transportation Plank of their platform of 1956 which reads:
Transportation: The public and national, defense interests
require development and maintenance, under the competitivefree
enterprise system, of a strong, efficient, and financially
sound system of common carrier transportation by water, highway,
rail and air, with each mode enabled, through sound and intelli
gent exercise of regulatory powers, to realize its inherent
economic advantages and reflect its full competitive capabili
ties. Public interest also requires, under reasonable standards,
the admission of new licenses, where public convenience may be
served, into the transport fields. We deplore the lack of
enforcement of safety regulations for protection of life and
property under present Republican Administration, and pledge
strict enforcement of such regulations.
The same trend of-thought may be seen in the Democratic platforms of
subsequent national campaigns and in later legislative actions by
which they sought to implement these principles. °

One might.thus

syllogize that the attitudes of the Democratic commissioners appointed
during the 1960s, who were acquiring an education and experience in
the late 1930s, favored more regulation, while the opposite would
be true of the Republican members.

Conditions for Effective Influence

i
Under what conditions can party leaders in and out of govern
ment effectively influence the decisions of the Interstate Commerce
Commission?

Freeman specified that:

36Ibid., pp. 531, 610.
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Ideal conditions [ for effective influence ] would exist when
the Administration and Congress are dominated by the same majority
viewpoint; when they can point to a clear margin of public confi
dence in election returns, in editorial comment and in public
opinion polls; and when this sentiment reinforces the control of
the Administration over the Bureaucracy and the control of the
Congress over its committee personnel. Under such conditions,
which are rare indeed, there would in fact be party government,
and the decisions made in subsystems would be little more than
reflections of the general political system.37
The fact that the Chief Executive and the Congressional
Leadership both wear the same labels does not mean that they have the
same "majority viewpoint," for the norm in this century has been for
there to be a conservative and a liberal faction in both major
political parties.

At the beginning of the period here under study,

Kennedy polled only 49.48 per cent of the popular vote in 1960,
which made him a "minority11 president.

The Chairmen of the

Congressional committees, while all nominally Democrats, were chiefly
from the conservative Southern faction of the party.
Nor was there a n. . . clear margin of public confidence in
election returns” until Johnson ran on his own in 1964.
this margin dwindled by 1968.

Nevertheless,

Even the editorial comment and the

public opinion polls reflected the gradual loss of public confidence,
and the presidency was ultimately lost to the Republicans in 1970.
As to the

. . control of the Administration over the

Bureaucracy,1* this remained in the hands of the liberal faction of

J. Leiper Freeman, The Political Process: Executive
Bureau--Legislative Committee Relations (Rev. ed„; New York: Random
House, 1965), p. 59.
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the Democratic Party by virtue of the fact that the noncareer
executive appointments were handled directly out of the Executive
Office of the President during the Kennedy era.

By contrast, the

". . . control of the Congress over its committee personnel . . . ”
remained with the conservative members of the party due to the
seniority system which ensured that the long-tenured Southerners from
one-party districts held the reins.

The conditions during the period

under study were, therefore, less than ideal for effective political
influence on the Commission.
The opinions of Bernstein, Herring, Mansfield and others who
have commented on the role that partisan politics played in the
decisionmaking process of the Interstate Commerce Commission twenty,
thirty and even forty years ago bolster a null hypothesis that there
will be no differences between the Republican and Democratic members'
views on regulatory matters.

This assumption is further reinforced

by Bernstein's observation that:
The lack of a close correlation of party affiliation and
regulatory views should not be surprising. Frequently the
President in designating a commissioner from the opposite party
will select a man who does not represent the dominant views of
that party. Franklin Roosevelt often appointed Republicans who
were closer to the policy of his administration than many
Democrats were. Moreover, as commissioners share their regula
tory experience and influence one another, party differences on
general economic policies come to have less relevance to
day-to-day problems.38
Alternative hypotheses which would indicate a Democratic bias

38]3ernstein, op. cit., p. 104.

in the decisions of the Commission were constructed around four
general areas of regulatory interest to transportation mentioned in
the Democratic Platform of 1956; i.e., franchises; finances and
unifications; rates, charges, services, and their schedules; and
enforcement of safety regulations.

A fifth area of prior proceedings

and judicial review was added to determine if the commissioners were
upholding the work of their career employees, and if the Commission
was taking action consistent with judicial opinions in matters
reviewed by the. courts and remanded to the Commission for further
action or consideration.

How the attitudes of the individual

commissioners were evaluated from the written decisions of the
Commission is the subject of subsequent chapters.

CHAPTER III

RESEARCH DESIGN

In 1961, Stuart S. Nagel of the University of Arizona wrote
an article in the American Political Science Review in which he
explored the empirical relationships between political party affilia
tion and judges’ decisions as his primary objective.

He selected

298 state and federal supreme court judges, determined their party
affiliations from appropriate biographical references, and then
analyzed cases in fifteen typical major fields of judicial decisionmaking in which the judges had participated.

Bis particular interest

was to develop, if possible, an indicator for predicting how judges
on ^bipartisan appellate courts would divide when they could not
ao
agree. ^

Each judge was given a "decision score" by Nagel which
represented the proportion of times that a judge voted for a specific
class of litigant, i.e., defendant in criminal cases, administrative
agency in business regulation cases, et cetera, cut of the total
number of times he voted in that category.

Where a judge did not

vote clearly for either the plaintiff or defendant, particularly if he

39stuart
Nagel, "Political Party Affiliation and Judges1
Decisions," American Political Science Review, LX, 4 (December 1961),
p . 843.
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concurred in part or dissented in part, he was given a one-half vote.
The data were then analyzed to determine what party affilia
tion, if any, was consistently associated with decision scores above
the average in each category of case.

The probability of finding the

observed differences between Republican and Democratic judges purely
by chance, considering the number of judges in each category, was
also computed to determine if any were statistically significant.
Nagel then sought to explain those relationships which were statis
tically significant, although he admits quite frankly that several
S'; ■■
factors make the apparent definite correlations less than perfect.
Method.
Using the Nagel article as a model, the writer sought to
replicate the procedure, but with a smaller population, using the
Interstate Commerce Commission as the object of research.

Instead of

fifteen areas of law, the author used four areas of general transpor
tation issues in which the Commissioners would be involved in
making quasi-judicial decisions, and a fifth area of prior proceedings
to see how consistently the Commissioners applied public policy'and
supported both their subordinate career employees and the courts of
appellate jurisdiction.

The period chosen for study was from 1960

through 1967, because it was the most'recent period for which the
bound volumes of Reports of the Interstate Commerce Commission were
available.

The cases were reviewed until a sufficient number in each

category had been accumulated to provide a statistically significant
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population for computation.
One difficulty in operationalizing the Nagel method to an
administrative agency such as the Interstate Commerce Commission was
that the nature of the duties of the Commission were different in most
cases from that of the courts of appellate jurisdiction.

The latter,

for the most part, are engaged in determining either the private rights
of litigants in civil cases, or the guilt or innocence of defendants
in criminal cases.

Because of the adversary nature of court cases,

Nagel was able, to state a definite position in each type of case as a
standard of measurement.
Since there are more than two parties at interest, interveners,
and public policy to be considered in administrative determinations,
there cannot always be a dichotomcus situation from which to select a
standard of measurement.

This being the case, a series of positions on

each of four general transportation issues, and the issue of precedence
in prior proceedings were developed to establish a Democratic view
point.

This party was selected since they were nominally in charge

of both the Congress and the Administration during the period under
investigation.

These positions were then used as a standard of

measurement in the same manner as Nagel used his standard.
The four areas of general transportation interest selected
were the matter of franchises; finances and unifications; rates,
charges, services and their schedules; and safety regulation enforce
ment*
stated:

In the matter of franchises, the 1956 Democratic Platform
"Public interest also requires, under reasonable standards,
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the admission of new licenses, where public convenience may be served,
in the transport fields. . . ."
There is also an emphasis on "the competitive free enterprise
system," and "full competitive capabilities."

Therefore, the standard

set of responses relative to franchises must reflect disapproval of
requests for new franchises, or transfers or modifications of existing
ones which would lessen competition, or which were not in the public
interest.

Conversely, the granting of new franchises, or the trans-

ferral of existing operating rights to qualified applicants to
increase competition and serve public convenience and necessity would
meet the criteria.

Included in the latter'group would be the granting

of permission to agricultural interests and others meeting- the
provisions of the law to operate as exempt operations as provided by
40
Parts II and III of the Act.
Requests for the abandonment of lines
or the discontinuance of services by railroads would be considered
contrary to public convenience and necessity, or as an inability to
meet competition and thus deserving of disapproval.

The disciplining

of operators who violate the terms of their franchises would be con- „
sidered as good public policy in the enforcement of the law.
With respect to finances and unifications, the Democratic
tradition of rigid regulation of big business would militate against
any reorganization plans designed for the benefit of the stockholders
rather than the public.

On the same basis, mergers, consolidations,

Interstate Commerce Act, Title XLIX, Statutes at Large, U.S.
Code, Vol. Liv7se.cs. 304, 902 (1940).
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or acquisitions of control which are. designed to lessen competition
and concentrate the financial control in the hands of a few would be
subject to disapproval.
In the matter of rates, charges, services and their schedules
the Populist view of reducing rates and. charges to a reasonable level,
providing adequate services, and eliminating preferences, prejudices,
and discriminations has long been considered by Democrats to be in the
public interest.

In this connection, the finding of violations of the

law and regulations in rate matters, and the vigorous exercise of the
ratemaking and rulemaking powers of the Commission would be taken as
indications of ". . . sound and intelligent exercise of regulatory
power S-. . . . "

In view of the preeminent position which the courts

have granted the Federal Government in the regulation of interstate
commerce, the countermanding of actions by individual states in rate
disputes would also be considered as "sound and intelligent" in the
interest of uniformity and equity.
The strict enforcement of safety regulations would include the
promulgation of standards and the investigation of accidents to
ascertain proximate causes so that appropriate corrective actions may
be taken to prevent recurrences.
In the review of prior proceedings, both those heard on
petition and those remanded from Federal Courts, the affirmation of
prior orders and reports of findings, or the taking of actions
consistent with the opinions of the courts were considered to be in
support of the career employee members of the subordinate boards and
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bureaus of the Commission, or in support of the Federal Judiciary.

In

either case it was considered to be the Democratic position during the
period under study.
The standard responses against which the voting patterns in
each case were measured follow:
Franchises:
a)

Disapproving certificates and permits, modifica

tions thereto, or transfers thereof when the applicant is:
(1)

A railroad having an annual operating

income of 3 billion dollars or more, or;
(2)

A motor carrier having an annual operating

income of 1 billion dollars or more.
b)

Disapproving requests for abandonment of lines or

discontinuance of service by railroads.^
c)

Classifying an operation as an exempt, unregulated

enterprise in accordance with the law.
d)

Finding operators to be in violation of the law,

their certificates or permits.
e)

Granting certificates and permits, or transferring

operating rights to qualified applicants other than those in a) above.

4-lxhe Interstate Commerce Commission has no authority to
prevent abandonment of routes, or discontinuances of services by
other carriers.

Finances and Unifications:
a)

Disapproving financial plans submitted by fidu

ciaries in corporate reorganizations to provide operating capital for
continued operation of the business for the benefit of stockholders
and creditors, rather than for other considerations.
b)

Denying authority to issue additional securities

c)

Denying authority to assume obligations, liabil

for any purpose.

ities, and guarantees in connection with.mergers, consolidation of
lines, or unifications.
d)

Denying authority for sale and/or purchase of

asset?, leases, operating rights, agreements, or securities between
two or more carriers.
e)

Finding mergers, consolidations, or acquisitions

of control not to be consistent with the public interest.
Rates, Charges, Services, and their Schedules:
a)

Countermanding actions of state regulatory

agencies in matters of rate levels, rate structure, or service
charges.
b)

Exercising the ratemaking or rulemaking authority

of the Commission.
c)

Finding undue preference, prejudice, or discrim

ination in rate cases.
d)

Finding violations of the Act, or of the

Commission's rules in connection with rate matters.
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e)

Denying requests for relief from the long- and

short-haul provisions of Section 4 of the Interstate Commerce Act.
f)

Denying requests for specific or general rate

level or charges increases.
g)

Finding rates to be inapplicable, unjust,

unreasonable, or otherwise unlawful.
h)

Ordering changes to, or cancellations of

schedules (tariffs), and/or operating agreements.
i)

Finding violations of law and/or regulations in

rate cases other than those mentioned above.
Enforcement of Safety Regulations:
a)

Promulgating and enforcing rules, standards, and

instructions on traffic control systems, safety appliances, and
methods.
b)

Enforcing paragraph (b) of Section 25 of the Act

by not approving modifications to existing safety devices and systems
which would lower the standards already set.
c)

Investigating accidents and making determinations

as to proximate causes and fixing responsibility.
d)

Promulgating rules on the transportation of

dangerous articles by rail and highway modes.
Prior Proceedings and Judicial Review:
a)

Affirming prior orders and reports of findings

the same matters, which were administratively adjudicated by hearing
examiners, employee boards or divisions of the Commission.
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b)

Taking action consistent with the opinion of th

court which remanded the case to the Commission for further consid
eration.

Procedure
The data on the issues involved, the voting pattern of the
Commissioners, the identity of the nonparticipants, and the division
of the vote for or against the standard responses were extracted from
the bound volumes of the Interstate Commerce Reports, coded and
accumulated on keypunch card work sheets.

Data cards were then

keypunched, verified, and read into a computer.

A program was

developed which processed the data so that the cases in each category
were arranged in descending order of vote division, and then chrono
logically within each vote division.

The program also recorded the

number of times each commissioner voted in accordance with the
standard, against the standard, or failed to participate on the case,
as were the number of cases in which a seat was vacant.

Sometimes a

commissioner did not vote clearly for or against the standard, par
ticularly if he concurred in part or dissented in part.
occasions his vote was valued at one-half.

On such

For instance, in two of

the cases remanded to the Commission by the Federal Courts,
Commissioner Stafford cast such halfway votes giving him a decision
score of one out of a possible three, or .33.
The data was then analyzed to determine what party affiliation,
if any, went consistently with a decision score above the average of
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the Commission as a whole in each category of issue.

For example, the

question was asked whether the Democrats and Republicans differed in
the proportion of those above and below average.

The answer was

arrived at in each instance by totaling all of the decision scores
for all of the commissioners involved in cases of that type and
arriving at an average.

The separate scores of the Democrats and

the Republicans were then classified as being above or below the
average.

Ry the use of the Fisher Exact Probability Test, as modi

fied by Tocher, the probabilities that exactly this proportion of
Democrats and Republicans would be found as being above the average
decision score for the group was then computed, as well as the
probability that there would be an even more extreme distribution of
proportions.

/o

The results of the test for the data used appear in

Table 2.

42s. Siegel, Non-Parametrie Statistics for the Behavioral
Sciences (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), pp. 96-104.

TABLE 2
DIFFERENCES IN DECISION SCORES OF REPUBLICAN AND
DEMOCRATIC COMMISSIONERS TO THE STANDARD
DEMOCRATIC RESPONSES BY ISSUE CATEGORY
■’

Categories

“""

Cases

“""■'■■■"
Differ
Number of
Repubs. Demos. ence in
Above Above
Commissioners
Percent
Involved
Average Average
age
Repubs. Demos.
Points
(%>
(%)

Franchises

79

5

8

80

38

42

Finances and
Uni fication s

57

5

8

40

38

2

Rates, Charges,
Services and
Their Schedules

154

7

9

7z

67

5

Enforcement of
Safety Regula
tions

54

6

8

50

38

12

152

7

9

86

56

30

Prior Proceedings
and Judicial
Review
Notes:

None of these proportions were statistically significant when
the Fisher Exact Probability Test was applied.
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CHAPTER IV

EVALUATION

The authors of the original "Act to Regulate Commerce"
conceived two devices to insure a decrease in the role of partisan
influence on the decisions of the Interstate Commerce Commission.

The

first was the bipartisan composition of the Commission and the second
was the seven-year- term of the commissioners so as not to coincide
with either the appointing presidential term or the confirming
senatorial terms.

AQ

But, as Nagel points out in his article, where

such devices are operative the members of tribunals have a greater
tendency to vote contrary to their party patterns.^

To see if the

same observation would apply to the Interstate Commerce Commission,
a measure of "contrariness" was developed to determine the proportion
of the commissioners who were voting against their party pattern.
For this analysis a commissioner was considered to have voted
contrary to the tenets of his party if he were a Republican above
(or a Democrat below) the average decision score of the Commission in

^Robert e . Cushman, The Independent Regulatory Commissions
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1941), p. 61.
^Stuart S. Nagel, "Political Party Affiliation and Judges1
Decisions," American Political Science Review, LX, 4 (December 1961),
p. 848.
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the majority of categories in which he participated.

Conversely, if a

Republican were below (or a Democrat were above) the Commission
average he was considered to have upheld his party's position.

Using

these parameters, Column 6 of Table 2 was changed to reflect the
contrariety of the Democrats and the differences in percentage points
and probabilities were recomputed.

The result appears in Table 3.

The first thing that will be noticed is that in three of the
five categories five Democrats always voted contrarily.

Further

investigation disclosed that it was not always the same five individ
uals.

One Republican voted consistently in favor of liberal posi

tions, while another did so in the three, categories in which he
partre ipated*
Why so many of the commissioners of both political persuasions
would'be voting contrary to their party's views may only be confirmationvof the observations in a study cn executives in government,
sponsored by the Brookings Institution in 1957, that there is little
or no concern with prospective appointee's political affiliations.^
The second observation is that in the category of Franchises,
80 per cent of the Republican Commissioners were voting liberally for
increases in the numbers of new competitors in the transportation
field.

(Over 80 per cent of the applications voted upon were in the

motor carrier branch of the industry.)

The Democratic members on the

^■5paul T. David and Ross Pollock, Executives for Government:
Central Issues of Federal Personnel Administration (Manasha,
Wisconsin: Brookings Institution, 1957), pp. 20-28.

TABLE 3
PROPORTION OF CONTRARY DECISIONS BY REPUBLICAN
AND DEMOCRATIC COMMISSIONERS BY
ISSUE CATEGORY

Categories

Cases

Differ
Number of
Re pubs. Demos. ence in
Commissioners
Above Above
Percent
Involved
Average
age
Average
Points
Repubs. Demos.
(%)
(%)

Franchises

79

5

8

80

62

22

Finances and
Unifications

37

5

8

40

62

22

Rates, Charges,
Services and
.Their Schedules

154

7

9

72

33

39

Enforcement of
Safety Regula
tions

54

6

8

50

62,

12

152

7

9

86

44

42

.Prior Proceedings
and Judicial
Review
Notes;

None of the above proportions were statistically significant
when the Fisher Exact Probability Test was applied.
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other hand seemed to be seeking to restrain the competition in
contrast to the party's position as stated in their platforms.

The

question of protecting existing carriers against competition has long
been an important one and revolves around "public convenience and
necessity" or "consistency with the public interest" on the one side, •
and the fitness, willingness, and ability of the new applicants to
perform the proposed service on the other.
both instances is on the applicant.

The burden of proof in

A liberal or conservative vote,

therefore, reflects the ability of the applicant to produce evidence
that outweighs the objections of existing competitive carriers who may
be, -and usually are, interveners in opposition to the application.
The category of Finances and Unifications dealt almost
exclusively with railroads with only one or two cases involving
transcontinental passenger carriers by highway.

Since- all of the

petitioners could be classified as "big business," it is not unusual
to find only 40 per cent of the Republicans voting contrary to party
pattern; but what is surprising at first glance is to find 62 per cent
of the Democrats voting to support the mergers.

The task before the

Commission in these instances is to weigh the advantages of preserving
the competition between independent carriers and the advantages
"in the public interest," of improved service, lower costs and the
like which may accrue from any particular consolidation.

This,

after all, is the Populist view so popular at the turn of the century
and which the Democrats adopted.
The control of rates, charges and services was the prime mover
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in the adoption of the original "Act to Regulate Commerce."

The

traditional Populist view of lower rates and charges for improved
services to small business, shippers and agricultural interests may
account for the low order of contrary votes by Democratic Commissioners.
The large number of contrary votes by Republican Commissioners
in support of the Democratic viewpoint is difficult to analyze since
such an approach would reduce the revenue of the carriers involved
thus reducing the profit margin.

Such a stand would alienate the

railroad industry, long a supporter of the Republicans.
The large contrary vote in matters of safety regulation
enforcement may indicate that the Commission is administering laws
which did not contemplate the wholesale abandonment of rail lines,
curtailment of passenger services and the reduction of freight
schedules which make some of the modifications to safety devices and
systems feasible at this time.

The Commission in applying adminis

trative discretion may have compensated for some of the deficiencies
in the law.
With regard to prior proceedings and judicial review, the
statistics merely demonstrate the high regard the Commission has for
the competency of its staff and. the integrity of the Federal
Judiciary.
The phenomenon of contrariety in the decisions of the
Commission was also investigated in relation to the limitations which
Simon feels affects the ability of administrators to perform ration
ally as decisionmakers.

As Simon points out:
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On one side, the individual is limited by those skills,
habits and reflexes which are no longer in the realm of the
conscious. . . .
On a second side, the individual is limited by his values and
the conceptions of purpose which influence him in making his
decisions. . . .
On a third side, the individual is limited by the extent of
his basic knox^ledge of things relevant to his job. This applies
both to the basic knowledge required in decisionmaking--a bridge
designer must know the fundamentals of mechanics--and to the
information that is required to make his decisions appropriate to
the given situation. . .

Evaluation of Backgrounds
Since the skills, habits, reflexes and values are assimilated
during childhood and adolescence, it would be almost impossible to
•assess these attributes in each commissioner without detailed knowledge
-of-his upbringing, something which is not available.

The conceptions

-of/purpose is one of the attitudes which this study seeks to arrive at
by*;;comp arisen with a standard.

The extent of the basic knowledge of

things relative to the job of a commissioner can be determined by a
survey of the backgrounds of the commissioners, particularly with
respect to their higher education and early■employment.
To determine what part these background factors may have played
in the pattern of contrariety, the sixteen commissioners under study
were divided into two groups based on a series of attributes as
indicated in the first two columns of Table 4.

The null hypothesis in

this case was that there would be no difference in the proportions of

^Herbert s imon, Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision
Making Processes in Administrative Organizations (New York: Macmillan
Co., Inc., 1954), p. 40.

TABLE 4
•RELATIONSHIP OF ATTRIBUTES AND CONTRARIETY
TO PARTY POLICIES

Group I

Group II

49 years
of age or
younger at
time of
appointment

Over 49 years
of age at
time of
appointment

Republicans
appointed
'by Democrats

Contrary
Votes in
Number
Each
In Each
Group
Group
a>
(I) (II) (i) (ii)

10

6

60

66

Democrats
appointed
by Democrats

2

5

50

60

Republicans
appointed by
Republicans

Democrats
appointed by
Republicans

5

4

80

50

Reappointed
to
additional
term(s)

Appointed to
partial or
single
terms

5

11

40

73

Elected to
Chairmanship

Never elected
as Chairman

8

8

63

63

Held public
office

Never held
public office

12

4

75

25

Appointed to
Never appointed
public office
to public
and had legal
office and had
training
legal training
4
80
10
Notes:
Every commissioner who held an elective public
office also held an appointive office at some time.
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contrary votes cast by members of the two groups.
Age and position as Chairman of the Commission seems not to
have made any difference in the proportions of contrary votes.

The

greatest impact seems to have come from Republicans appointed by
Republicans, individuals who had both experience in public office and
legal training, and those who were appointed to single terms.

Only

the public office experience and legal training are in any way
indicative of a trend, for when the legal training factor is held
constant, the percentage of contrary votes among those who had public
office, experience rises by 5 per cent.

None of the proportions are

truly significant when the Fisher Exact Probability Test is applied.
It Is of further interest to note that the number of contrary
votes among Democrats is highest among those who were appointed by
Democratic Presidents, while the same phenomenon occurs with respect to
Republicans appointed by Republicans.

One might think that there is an

overcompensation to ensure that the taint of partisan politics in the
decisions is avoided, but in reading the written reports there was no
evidence to support such a contention.

The approach of David and

Pollock that little attention is paid to political affiliations in
making top-level appointments and the notion that such jobs as
appointments to commissions are given to opposition factions within
the administration party both have merit . ^

The truth in this case

probably lies somewhere between the two.

^David and Pollock, op. cit., pp. 20-28.
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Whether the 75 per cent of the members who voted contrarily
lasted only one term because of their nonalignment with party policy
is difficult to ascertain with any degree of accuracy, but 77 per cent
of the Democrats failed of reappointment, while 57 per cent of the
Republicans did not receive a second term.

There are, of course,

other considerations involved in the single term pattern.

First,

many "of the commissioners are able to make contacts in industry based
on their position and when their term is finished, if not before,
they are able to obtain more remunerative employment outside of the
government service.

Political vagaries within the seven-year span

of the term make clearance of reappointments with party functionaries
at the state.and national level a gauntlet not so easily run the
second time around.

Only those who make an outstanding contribution

--to the work of the Commission, like Joseph P. Eastman or
Kenneth H. Tuggle, are likely to be reconsidered.
The combination of experience in public office and legal
training, which apparently strengthens the trend to contrariety,
also has a bearing on the knowledge of things relevant to the job
of commissioner, as well as to the basic knowledge required in the
decisionmaking tasks.

Only one commissioner, Rupert L, Murphy, had

ever been actively employed as a transportation lawyer.

The rest had

been exposed to the technical problems of the transportation industry
through their previous positions as members or employees of state
regulation agencies, or, as in a couple of instances, as members of
Interstate Commerce Commission Staff, or staffs of the appropriate
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Congressional Committees.

This lack of basic knowledge of the

economics of the transportation industry among the commissioners
forces them to rely on the Commission staff, which also unfortunately
has no professional economists.

The only other source of information

n. . . that is required to make his decisions appropriate to the
given situation . . .n is contained in the briefs and petitions which
are part of the legalistic and judicial environment of the Commission.
As lawyers, the commissioners have the requisite knowledge to
apply the law to the facts, and as experienced public servants, some
have the basic knowledge of the politics involved in executing public
policy.

This type of political action at the Commission level is

basedj not so much on partisan considerations, as it is on the value
judgment :of each

individual commissioner as influenced by the

substantiated facts in the evidence adduced in each case.

Conclusions
There were two purposes in mind during the research of the
decisions of the Interstate Commerce Commission; first, to determine
what influence, if any, party affiliation of the commissioners had on
their decisions, and second, what attitudes or beliefs could be
deduced from their voting patterns.
When the relationships between political party affiliation and
adjudicative administrative decisions turned out to be insignificant
in the positive sense, an effort was made to see if there were a
tendency to vote contrarily, which might account for the lack of
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positive correlation.

This test too turned out to be statistically

insignificant.
Aside from the fact that there may have been too few cases in
the statistical population, there are many other reasons for such a
lack of correlation between party affiliation and decisions on the
issues involved.

One of the most important factors, it is felt,

derives from the fact that commissioners, like others, may have
differing personal value systems yet belong to the same political
party as those.who appoint and confirm them in office.

A commissioner

may. join one party rather than the other, and stay affiliated with it,
not because of its stand on particular issues, but rather because it
is :the dominant party in his geographical area, because his parents
belonged to it, for ethnic reasons, or for various other reasons
which do not necessarily involve a congruence of value systems between
the individual and the party of his choice.

Personal experience also

has a great deal to do with the development of attitudes normally
associated with "liberal" or "conservative" political views and
values.
Attitudes may deviate in certain areas, as for instance when a
commissioner with previous regulatory experience at the state level may
be liberal on franchise issues, but may be a. stickler on rates.

A

conservative, by the same token, may favor large unifications, not
because of his party affiliation, but because of some obtuse back
ground element.
What must also be considered is the fact that the Commission
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in its actions operates both as an activity which expresses the will
of the Federal Government, and as an adjunct to the execution of that
will.

In the former role there is not the latitude for the exercise

of the discretionary powers that is afforded by the executive role.
The enunciation of policy is primarily the function of Congress as
expressed through legislation.

Here the Commission may recommend

or interpret, but the recommendations may not come to fruition, and
the interpretations are subject to judicial review.
The discretion afforded the Commission in the execution of the
will of Congress extends to a determination of whether or not to recon
sider a report of a lower echelon, to permit a reargument of a previous
decision, or to authorize a rehearing in the matter.

Simon points out:

Within the area of discretion, once an individual has decided
on the basis of his personal motives to recognize organizational
n objectives, his further behavior is determined, not by his
personal motives, but by the demands of efficiency. . . .^
This concept may very well apply to members of the Commission.
The period of discretion for them occurs before a case is heard in
reargument, or reconsideration, or rehearing.

During the prefatory

period the value system of the individual, which may account for his
party affiliation, is operative in the decisionmaking process.

Once

the decision is made to hear the case ert banc then the demands of
efficiency probably predominate.

This may account for the low order

of correlation found in the research.

^Simon, op. cit.t p. 204.
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LIST OF CASES STUDIED

095MCC0533PACIFIC MTR TRKG CO
095MCC0710ICC IN RE MTR TRANS&AIRCF
096MCC1503CENTL FRT LINES U E.TEX.
096MCC1603ZUZICH TRK LINES-INVESTIG
096MCC1960PRACTICES OF MTR CC OF HG
096MCC2433TRANSAMERICANFREIGHT LINE
09 6MCC 24 63LEONARD BROS TRSFR
096MCC5833NASHUA. MTR EXPRESS
097MCC2063NATIONAL TRANSP CO-PURCHA
097MCC4273MIDWEST BUS LINES-PURCHAS
097MCC 7003BUCKINGHAM TRANSP INC
098MCC1543BELAWARE EXPRESS CO-EXTN
098MCC2623FISCHBACK TRUCKING CO
098MCC3563E A GALLAGHER & SONS
098MCC4830MTR CARRIER TEMPORARY AUT
098MCC5103FROZEN FOOD EXPRESS
098MCC5223J0S BALAZS SR-APPLICATION
098MCC6073SOUTHWEST FRT LINES
0 98MCC 6813 EDDL EMAN BROS -APP.LICATION
098MCC7023LESTER C NEWTON
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09 SMCC 7123GREYHOUND CORP-EXTN-L.I.
098MCC7513J EDW JARMAN APPLICATION
099MCC0193HALE DISTRIBUTING CO INC
099MCC1413WILLIS SHAW FRZN EXP CO
099MCC2813C & H TRANSPORTATION CO
099MCC3513HESS CARTAGE CO
099MCC5913ARGO-COLLIER CORP-EXTN
099MCC6683ALASKA TRUCK TRANSPORT
100MCC0183WILLIS SHAW FRZN EXPRESS
1OOMCC0343DEVON OWENS-CONTRACT APPL
100MCC2706KERRVILLE TOURS-BROKER
100MCC2796 TNM&O TOURS INC-BROKER
100MCC3863W W HUGHES
10OMCC4323MI.CHAUD BUS LINES EXTN
1OOMCC 45 33GREYHOUND CORP V EDWARDS
10OMCC4823BRASWELL FREIGHT LINES
1OOMCC6653GREYHOUND LINES INC

EXT

101MCC4443OHIO SOUTHERN EXPRESS PUR
101MCC5163HELPHREY MTR FRT-PURCHASE
101MCC5 293 TRANSC ONTINENTAL-2 ACQUIS
101MCC6553CARLSBAD CAVERN COACH
101MCC7193EAZOR EXPRESS INC
102MCC2673AMERICAN MVRS CONF ET AL
102MCC2913CENTL FRT L V STRICKLAND
102MCC4113ARMD CARRIER CORP-EXTN
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102MCC4293L0NG RANS CO-EXTN
102MCC4573ZANTOP AIR TRANS-INVEST
102MCC4923H. MESSICK INC EXTN
102MCC5270AGRICULTURAL TRANS ASSN
102MCC5773T I MCCORMACK TRKG CO
103MCC0913MOSS TRKG INVESTIGATION
103MCC1953ARROW LINES INC EXTENSION
103MCC3073SUBLER MODIFICATION
103MCC3183KINGPAK INC INVESTIGATION
103MCC4833GRIFFIN MOBILE HOMES
1Q3MCC7363W T MAYFIELD SONS TRKG CO
103MCC7980CACHE VALLEY DAIRY ASSN
103MCC9343JOE JONES JR CONTRACT CAR
31CICC0671FRISCO LINE DIV3 REPORT
310ICC0741NYC RR DIV3 REPORT
310ICC1021NYC RR DIV3 REPORT
31.0ICC4591B L 6c W DIV3 REPORT
310ICC4631C B & Q,WABASH DIV3 REPT
310ICC4651B &

0 RR

DIV3 REPORT

310ICC5402B &

M RR DIV3 REPORT

310ICC7911M K

T RR

DIV3 REPORT

311ICC0011NYC RR DIV3 REPORT
31IICC0541B 6c 0 RR

DIV3 REPORT

311ICC1731B 6c M RR DIV3 REPORT
311ICC17 71SEABOARD DIV3 REPORT

311ICC1841NYC RR DIV3 REPORT
311ICC1891NYC RR DIV3 REPORT
3UICC2071SOPAC DIV3 REPORT
311ICC2112C RI & P & C B &Q DIV3RPT
311ICC2161D L 6c W RR DIV3 REPORT
311ICC2291SEABOARD DIV3 REPORT
311ICC2411SEABOARD DIV3 REPORT
311ICC2461NYCRR DIV3 REPORT
311ICC2491SEABOARD DIV3 REPORT
311ICC3311SEABOARD DIV3 REPORT
311ICC3371SEABOARD DIV3 REPORT
311ICC3491SEABOARD DIV3 REPORT
311ICC4691C M STP & P DIV3 REPORT
311ICC4741B 6c M RR DIV3 REPORT
313ICC1441M K T RR CO DIV3 REPORT
313ICC1511C & El RR CO DIV3 REPORT
313ICC2191NYC RR DIV3 REPORT
31.3ICC2251NYC RR DIV3 REPORT
313ICC2321READING DIV3 REPORT
313ICC2391NYC RR DIV3 REPORT
313ICC2651PENN RR IV3 REPORT
31.4ICC2661C RT.& P RR DIV3 REPORT
314ICC5611B 6c 0 RR, PENN RR, UNION DP
315ICC0731N Y C RR CO DIV3 REPORT
315ICC0991GREAT NORTHERN RWY DIV3 R
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315ICC3811PACIFIC ELECTRIC RWY DIV3
315ICC6631LEHIGH VALLEY RR DIV3 RPT
318ICC1517TEXAS RAILROAD COMMISSION
318ICC1990ICC DIV3 REPT
318ICC2298CUDAHY PACKING CO V AC&Y
318ICC3011KCS,L&A,FRISCO ET AL
3 18ICC3711L&N,ACL,SEABOARD ET AL
318ICC3953GORDANS TRANSPORT
318ICC4851ALL RAILROADS
318ICC5673PITTSBURGH & NEW ENGLAND
318ICC5893BRADY MOTORFRATE
318ICC5933MIDDLE ATLANTIC CONE^
314ICC0460NATL MTR EQUIP EXCHANGE
319ICC0839ELECTRIC BOAT V NYNH&H RR
319ICC141OWESTERN GROWERS ET AL
319ICC1827USA V OKLAHOMA-ADA-ATOKA
319ICC2275SEA-LAND - GARDEN HOSE
319ICC2353SCHWERMAN TRUCKING CO
319ICC2573JIM TIONA JR-ANIMAL FEED
319ICC3104SEA-TRAIN
319ICC4314SEA-TRAIN -RWR- ALUMINUM
319ICC6207CITY OF WILMINGTON V AGS
319ICC6271B & 0
319ICC7111C RR NJ,NY & LB ET AL
319ICC7531MONONGAHELA RWY CO DIV3 R
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319ICC7820SUGAR
320ICC1221SEABOARD-ACL MERGER
320ICC3191PENN RR-DISCONTINUANCE
320ICC6371OKMULGEE NORTHERN ABANDMT
321ICC0171A C&cY V A T&SF
321ICC1541SW FREIGHT BUREAU
321ICC2831ACL V SOUTHERN
321ICC3001B&M NYNH&H PENN V E CNTRL
321ICC3141ACL V SOUTHERN
321ICC3321WESTERN TRUNKLINE CARRIER
321ICC3 911SOUTH-WESTERN CARRIERS
3 21ICC4194SE ATRA.IN
321ICC4731NYC-ERIE-LACHAWANA
321ICC5190SOUTHEASTERN ASSN OF R&U
321ICC5641C & EL
321ICC5691MO PAC^T&P
321ICC5821SOUTHERN
321ICC7263CENTRAL STATES MTR FRT B
321ICC7387PORT OF NEW YORK AUTHRTY
322ICC0010PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS
322ICC1035FRANK P DOW INC EXTN
322ICC1381C B & Q V C & E L E T A L
322ICC2735FEDERAL SHIPPERS ASSN
3 2.2ICC3010SUBSTITUTED SERVICE-TOFC
322ICC4911A C&U RR V A T&SF RR

322ICC5290BRAZOS R HARBOR NAV DIST
322ICC5413PACIFIC INTERMOUNTAIN EXP
322ICC5600INCREASED SWITCHING CHARG
322ICC3721B & 0 V C & .EL ET AL
322ICC6201PULLMAN-STANDARD DIV3 RPT
322ICC74300MAHA GRAIN EXCH V CB&Q
323ICC0010POST OFFICE DEPT
323ICC0753NATURAL GAS PIPELINE
323ICC1312REPORTING STATISTICS
323ICC1857ALA STATE DOCKS V AT&N RR
3 23ICC2130STANISLAUS CTY V AT&SF RR
323ICC4563CARDINALE TRKG CORP
323ICC4681REA INVESTIGATION
323ICC7931ERIE-LACKAWANNA DIV3 REPT
3241CC0011N&W-STOCK ISSUEPWABASH
324ICC2081MONON RR
324ICC4604PITTSBURGH TOWING
3 24IC C 75 01NORPAC-ABANDONMENT&CONS T
325ICCOO11OFFICIAL & SOUTHERN RR
325ICC1063MIDDLEWEST MTR FRT BUREAU
325ICC1283MXLNE TRUCK LINE-INVEST.
325ICC1383LEEWAY
325ICC1473MID-AMERICAN TRK LINES IN
325ICC1631L & N RR DIV3-REPORT
325ICC1681SO PAG CO DIV3 REP
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325ICC1883TERMINAL TRANSPORT CO INC
325ICC3363DETENTION OF MTR VEH
325ICC3691C P STP & P RR DIV3 REPT
325ICC3 740BUREAU OF INQUIRY-DIV3 R
325ICC4491NORFOLK SOUTHERN RR
325ICC4583NATL MTR FRT TRAFFIC ASSN
325ICC66 97STATE OF NY
325ICC7220ICC- DIV3 REPORT
325ICC7521SOUTHERN,L&N ET AL
326ICC0063EASTCENTL MTR CARRIERS
326ICC0771PENN& L&N-INGOT MOLDS
326ICC2484BLACK NAVIGATION CO INC
326ICC2623NATL MTR FRT TRAFFIC ASSN
326ICC3581CMSTP&P GN E T ■AL
326ICC4153MID-WEST EMERY FRT SYSTEM
326ICC4531NYCRR TOFC & SEC 4 APPLCN
326ICC4835NATL ASSN FRT FWDRS
326ICC5111CENTRAL AND SW RR ET AL
326ICC7435DC ANDREWS & CO OF ILL.
327ICCOI01BOSTON & PROVIDENCE REORG
327ICC1511NY NH & H RR DISCONTINUE
327ICC279IMQ PAC CONTROL OF C & EL
327ICC3871WESPAC CONTROL OF W P RR
327ICC4751PENN-CENTRAL MERGER
328ICC2051DEPT OF JUSTICE ET AL
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328ICC2781CRI&P RR CO
328ICC3041PENNCENTRAL MERGER
328 ICC 34.51C ONTROL OF C PAC BY SPOAC
328ICC3691NJ & NY RR E-L CONTROL
328ICC4071ERIE LACKAWANA LOAN
328ICC4601BURLINGTON-NORTHERN MERGE
328ICC6841C&0 B&O CONTROL WEST MD
329ICC0I71SAL V SOUTHERN
329ICC0400STANISLAUS COUNTY V AT&SF
329ICC0.61.3MTR CARRIERS TRAFFIC ASSN
3 2 9ICC 16 71S OP AC & ST&SF RR-WINE
329I.CC1993CHASE TRANSFER CORP
329ICC2120CHICAGO -BOARD OF TRADE
329ICC2661SEABOARD - DIV3 REPT
329ICC2811B&0 AND W MD PAPER
329ICC4113PRIVATE MTR CARRIERS-EXPL
329ICC4203R.OCKY MTN MTR RATE BUREAU
329ICC4381L & N RR CO - DIV 3 REPT
329ICC4421ASSN OF AMERICAN RR-BRAKE
329ICC4588CALCIUM CARBONATE CO V MP
32 9ICC4661SOUTHERN RWY SYSTEM ALLWN
329ICC5290CHICAG0 BOARD OF TRADE
329ICC5398BIG RIVER INDUSTRIES
329ICC5491N&W NYCRR ET AL
329ICC6123MIDDLEWEST MTR FRT BUREAU

329ICC6690LK CHAS HARBOR &TERM DIST
329ICC7423UNITED VAN LINES INC
329ICC7861 SL-SF RR-FRISCO-ET AL
329ICC8241C & NW,PILLSBURY CO ET AL
329ICC8541CLASS I AND II RR

APPENDIX B

BIOGRAPHICAL MATERIAL ON THE COMMISSIONERS STUDIED

BROWN, VIRGINIA MAE

DEMOCRAT

West Virginia

Born:

Pliny, West Virginia, November 13, 1923

Education:

High School graduate.
A.B., West Virginia University, 1942.
L.L.B., West Virginia University Law
School, 1947.

Private Positions:

High School Teacher, Law Clerk.

Political Positions

Executive Secretary, West Virginia
Judicial Council, 1949.
Assistant Attorney General, West
Virginia, 1952-1956.
Counsel to the Governor of West
Virginia, 1961.
Insurance Commissioner, West Virginia,
1961.
Public Service Commissioner, West
Virginia, 1962.
Interstate Commerce Commissioner, 1964
- (Johnson).

Military Service:

None.
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BUSH, JOHN W.

DEMOCRAT

Born:

Columbus, Ohio, September 17, 1909.

Education:

High School graduate.

Ohio

B.S. in B.A., Virginia Polytechnic
Institute, 1931.
Private Positions:

Standard Oil Co. of La., Arkansas Div.,
1932.
Gasoline Distributor, Portsmouth, Ohio,
1937-1946 0
John W. Bush, Inc. (Tax & Business
Consultants), 1957-1958
Director in two food processing
concerns.

Political Positions:

State Purchasing Agent, Ohio, 1949-1957
Director of Commerce, Ohio, 1959-1961.
Interstate Commerce Commissioner, 1961
(Kennedy).

Military Service:

DEASON, WILLARD

None

DEMOCRAT

Born:

Stockdale, Texas, January 3, 1905.

Education:

High School graduate.
B.S., Southwest Texas College, 1930.
L.L.B.. San Antonio School of Law. 1934
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Private Positions:

Junior High School Teacher, 1930-1934.
Employee, KTBC Radio Station, 1946-1949.
Manager, KVET Radio Station, 1949-1965.

Political Positions:

Junior Attorney, Federal Land Bank,
1934-1935.
National Youth Administration, 1935-1942.
Presidential Elector, 1960.
Interstate Commerce Commissioner, 1965
(Johnson).

Military Service:

FREAS', HOWARD G.

Commander, U.S. Naval Reserve, 1942-1946.

REPUBLICAN

California

Born:

Fogelsville, Pennsylvania, July 13, 1900.

Education:

Graduate, Allentown Business College,
191.6.
Graduate, Mecersburg Academy, 1921.
Attended University of Nevada, 1921-1922.
Attended University of California, 1922.
Attended La Salle University, 1934-1936.

Private Positions:

Various positions with, railroads in
Pennsylvania and California, 19211925.
Assistant Traffic Manager, 1925-1928.
Instructor, Stanford University, 19421945.
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Political Positions

Employee, California Public Service
Commission, 1928-1953.
Interstate Commerce Commissioner, 1953
(Ei senhower); Reappointed, 1960
(Kennedy).

Military Service:

GOFF, ABE McGREGOR

None

REPUBLICAN

Idaho

Born:

Colfax, Washington, December 21, 1899.

Education:

High School graduate.
L.L.B., University of Idaho Law College,
•-

Private Positions:

1924.

• :

Private law practice, Moscow, Idaho,
1924.----------- ----

Political Positions;

Prosecuting Attorney, Lattah City,
Idaho, 1926-1934.
State Senator.
U.S. Representative, 1st District of
Idaho, 1947-1948.
General Counsel for the Post Office
Department, 1954.
Interstate Commerce Commissioner, 1958
(Eisenhower).

Military Service:

Colonel, Judge Advocate General's Corps,
U.S. Army, 1942-1946.
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HARDIN, DALE W.

DEMOCRAT

District of Columbia

Born:

Peoria, Illinois, September 9, 1922.

Education:

Attended Bradley University, 1941.
A.B. and A.A., George Washington
University, 1949.
J.D., George Washington University Law
School, 1951.

Private Positions:

Private law practice, 1951.
Secretary to Counsel of the
Transportation Association of
America, 1959.
Manager, Transportation and
Communications Department} U.S.
Chamber of Commerce, 1963-1966.

Political Positions:

Special Agent, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, 1951-1954.
Attorney Advisor, Bureau of Finance;
Legislation Attorney; Congressional
Liaison Officer; Interstate Commerce
Commission Staff, 1954-1963.
Interstate Commerce Commissioner, 1967
(Johnson).

Military Service:

U.S. Marine Corps, 1942-1946.
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HERRING, CLYDE E.

DEMOCRAT

Born:

Des Moines, Iowa, March 24, 1915.

Education:

High School graduate.

Idaho

B.A., State University of Iowa, 1937.
L.L.B., Drake University Law School,
1940.
Private Positions:

Private law practice, 1954-1959.

Political Positions:

Assistant City Attorney, 1945.
District Supervisor, U.S. Census, 1950.
County Attorney, 1951-1954.
Democratic Candidate for Governor, 1954.
Interstate Commerce Commissioner, 1959
(Eisenhower).

Military Service:

HUTCHINSON, EVERETT

Captain, Infantry, 1941-1945.

DEMOCRAT

Texas

Born:

Hempstead, Texas, January 2, 1915.

Education:

High School graduate, Hempstead, Texas.
A.B. in B.A. , L.L.B., University of
Texas, 1940.

Private Positions:

Private law practice, 1940-1941, 19461949, 1951-1955.
Attorney for Texas Railroads, 1946-1949.

Political Positions:

Texas Legislature, 1941 and 1943.
Assistant State Attorney General, 1949.
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Executive Assistant Attorney General and
Legislative Assistant, 1950.
Interstate Commerce Commissioner, 1955
(Eisenhower).
Military Service:

Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Naval. Reserve,
1942-1946.

LEE, WILLIAM IRWIN
Born:

REPUBLICAN

Idaho

Madison County, North Carolina,
January 2/*, 1882.

Education:

High School graduate.
A.B., University of Idaho, 1903.
L.L.B., National University Law School.

Private Positions:

None.

Political Positions

Private Secretary to Congressman,
B. L. French (R), Idaho.
Associate Justice, Supreme Court of
Idaho, 1922.
Chief Justice, Supreme Court of Idaho,
1926.
Interstate Commerce Commissioner, 1930
(Hoover); Reappointed, 1931 (Hoover);
Reappointed, 1939 (Roosevelt);
Reappointed, 1945 (Truman).

Military Service:

Captain, Quartermaster Corps, U.S. Army,
1917-1919.
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M c Ph e r s o n , d o n a l d p .
Born:

REPUBLICAN

Pennsylvania

Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, October 6,
1906.

Education:

Graduate, Gilman Country School.
B.A., Princeton University, 1928.
L.L.B., Harvard University Law School,
1931.

Private Positions:

Private law practice, 1934-1941.

Political Positions:

Chairman, Adams City Ration Board, 19411944.
State Senator, 1948 and 1952.
Interstate Commerce Commissioner, 1956
(Eisenhower).

Military Service:

Lieutenant, U.S. Naval Reserve, 19441946.

MINOR, ROBERT W.

REPUBLICAN

Ohio

Born:

Columbus, Ohio, December 15, 1919.

Education:

High School graduate, Columbus, Ohio.
A.B., Ohio State University, 1940.
J.D., Ohio State University Law School,
1948

Private Positions:

None.

Political Positions:

Assistant Counsel, Senate Investigations
Subcommittee, 1948-1949.
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Administrative Assistant to Senator
Bricker (R), Ohio, 1949-1953.
1st Assistant to Deputy U.S. Attorney
General, 1953-1956.
Interstate Commerce Commissioner, 1956
(Eisenhower).
Military Service:

MURPHY, RUPERT L.

Lieutenant Colonel, Infantry, 1941-1945.

DEMOCRAT

Georgia

Born:

Byronsville, Georgia, July 27, 1909.

Education:

High School graduate, 1925.
L.L.B., Atlanta Law School, 1938.
L.L.M., Atlanta Law School, 1939.

Private Positions:

Correspondent and Rate Clerk, Atlanta
Freight Tariff Bureau, 1925-1929.
Assistant Freight Traffic Manager,
Fulton Bag and Cotton Mills, 19291942.
Attorney and Traffic Manager, Georgia-Alabama Textile Traffic Association,
1942-1955.

Political Positions: Interstate Commerce Commissioner, 1955
. (Eisenhower).
Military Service:

None.
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SPLAWN, WALTER M. W.

DEMOCRAT

Born:

Arlington, Texas, June 16, 1883.

Education:

Attended Decatur College, 1904.

Texas

L.L.B., Baylor University, 1906.
B.A. and M.A. , Yale University,. 1908.
Ph.D., University of Chicago, 1916.
L.L.D., Howard Payne College.
Private Positions:

University Instructor, 1906-1912.
Admitted to Texas Bar, 1909.
Professor of Social Sciences, Baylor
University, 1916.
Dean, Baylor University, 1918.
Professor of Economics, University of
Texas, 1919-1928.
President, University of Texas, 1924-1927.
Director of Research in Social Sciences,
University of Texas, 1927-1928.
Dean, Graduate School, American
University, Washington, D. C., 1929.

Political Positions:

Member of Railroad Commission of Texas,
1924.
Chairman, Board of Arbitration of
Western Railroads and Groups of
Employees, 1927.
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Referee under settlement of War Claims
Act, 1920s.
Special Counsel to Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
House of Representatives, 71st
Cong., 1930.
Interstate Commerce Commissioner, 1934
(Roosevelt); Reappointed, 1940
(Roosevelt).
Military Service:

STAFFORD, GEORGE M„

None.

REPUBLICAN

Kansas

Born:

Valley Falls, Kansas, May 7, 1915.

Education:

Public Schools and Business College.

Private Positions:

None.

Political Positions:

Assistant Director, Kansas State Sales
Tax Division, 1939-1941.
Campaign Manager for Carlson for
Governor, 1946.
Executive Director, Republican State
Committee, Kansas 1946.
Executive Secretary to Governor Carlson,
-Kansas, 1946-1950.
Administrative Assistant to Senator
Carlson (R), Kansas, 1950-1967.
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Interstate Commerce Commissioner, 1967
(Johnson).
Military Service:

Private to Captain, 1942-1945.

TIERNEY, PAUL J.
Born:

North Umberland, Pennsylvania, June 3,
1916.

Education:

B.S., Georgetown College, 1938.
L.L.B., Georgetown University Law
School, 1949.

Private Positions:

None.

Political Positions:

Employee, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, 1939-1941.
Special Agent, Federal Bureau of '
Investigation, 1941-1953.
Member, Professional Staff,
Appropriations Committee, U.S.
Senate, 1953-1955.
Assistant Counsel, Senate Permanent
Subcommittee on Government
Operations, 1955-1957.
Assistant Counsel and Administrative
. Assistant to Chief Counsel, Senate
Select Committee on Improper
Activities in the Labor and
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Management Field, 1957-1959.
Returned to the Permanent Subcommittee,
1959-1963.
Interstate Commerce Commissioner, 1963
(Kennedy).
Military Service:

TUCKER, WILLIAM H.

None.

DEMOCRAT

Massachusetts

Born:

Boston, Massachusetts, December 8, 1923.

Education:

High School graduate, Roslindale,
Massachusetts.
Attended Boston University, 1945-1947.
L.'L.B., Boston University Law School,
1949.

Private Positions:

Private law practice, 1949-1961.

Political Positions:

Interstate Commerce Commissioner, 1961
(Kennedy).

Military Service:

TUGGLE, KENNETH H.

Sergeant, Airborne Infantry.

REPUBLICAN

Kentucky

Born:

Barbourville, Kentucky, June 12, 1904.

Education:

High School graduate.
B.A. , University of Kentucky, 1926.
Attended University of Kentucky Law
School.
L.L.D., Union College, 1947.
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Private Positions:

Private law practice, 1926-1953.
Chairman, Union National Bank.
Director in three companies.

Political Positions

City Attorney, Barbourville, Kentucky,
1928-1932.
Lieutenant Governor, Kentucky, 1943-1947
President, State Senate, 1944-1946.
Member, Committee on Interstate
Cooperation, 1944-1948.
Board of Managers, Council of State
Governments, 1944-1947.
Member, Kentucky Committee on Resources
and Functions of State Governments,
1950-1952.
Interstate Commerce Commissioner, 1953
(Eisenhower); Reappointed, 1955
(Eisenhower); Reappointed, 1963
(Kennedy).

Military Service:
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